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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 04-2100
            
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CELESTER VAUGHN,
Appellant
          
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 03-cr-00105-2)
District Judge: The Hon. Donetta W. Ambrose
         
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
Date: February 18, 2005
Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 4, 2005)
         
OPINION OF THE COURT
         
2ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Celester Vaughn, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, pled guilty
to Count Three of a five count indictment for distribution of cocaine in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(2000). When Vaughn appeared before the district court for sentencing, he
made an oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court denied the motion and
sentenced Vaughn to the mandatory minimum sentence, 120 months of imprisonment.
Vaughn now appeals his conviction and sentence. 
Vaughn’s counsel, Joseph M. Yablonski, has filed a motion and brief stating that,
after a conscientious examination of the record and relevant cases, he has determined that
Vaughn’s appeal is fully frivolous. He has requested permission to withdraw under
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We will grant counsel’s request to withdraw
and affirm the judgment of the district court. 
I.  
Because we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the facts, procedural
history and contentions presented, we will not recite them except as necessary to the
discussion. 
II. 
In Anders, the Supreme Court held that if, after conscientious review of the
record, counsel determines that there are no non-frivolous issues for review, he should
advise the court and request permission to withdraw. 386 U.S. at 744. This request must
3be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support
the appeal. Id. The Third Circuit’s Local Appellate Rule (“LAR”) 109.2(a) implements
the Anders command. This Court has a twofold inquiry: (1) whether counsel adequately
fulfilled the rule’s requirements; and (2) whether an independent review of the record
presents any non-frivolous issues. United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir.
2001). 
III. 
Here, Mr. Yablonski has fulfilled LAR 109.2(a)’s requirements. He conducted a
conscientious examination of the record and all available materials. Counsel also
identified two sentencing issues, both of which are frivolous. The first is whether the
district court erred in denying Vaughn’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. A defendant
may withdraw his guilty plea upon showing a “fair and just reason for requesting the
withdrawal.” Rule 11(d)(2)(B), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Whether a reason
is “fair and just” depends on three factors: (1) whether the defendant asserts his
innocence; (2) the strength of the defendant’s reasons for withdrawal; and (3) whether
the government would be prejudiced by the withdrawal. United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d
245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 815 (3d Cir.
2001)). 
Here, Vaughn satisfied the first prong of the test by asserting his innocence. The
strength of Vaughn’s assertion, however, is undercut by his earlier sworn admission to
4distributing cocaine. Vaughn also admitted that he helped set up the deal for distributing
cocaine. Vaughn’s stated reason for changing his guilty plea is not strong. In his plea
agreement, Vaughn stipulated to distributing at least 3.5 kilograms of cocaine. He argues
that the Government could not establish this amount at trial because the amount of
cocaine in controversy was actually less than two kilograms. Even if Vaughn could prove
his position at trial, the mandatory minimum would still be 120 months because the
Government filed a notice of enhancement pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851. Finally, the
Government would be prejudiced by Vaughn’s withdrawal because a trial date had been
set, the jury had been selected and witnesses had been subpoenaed when Vaughn entered
his guilty plea. Vaughn did not move to withdraw until the date of the sentencing hearing
and a crucial Government witness may not have been available at that time.
The second identified issue is whether the district court erred in any respect in the
sentence it imposed. The guilty plea proceeding complied with Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the requirements articulated by the Court in Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). As explained above, Vaughn disputes the amount of
cocaine used in calculation of his sentence and the impact of that amount on his sentence.
This stipulation did not drive his sentence. Rather, his sentence was driven by his guilty
plea to Count Three of the indictment and his prior felony drug conviction. See United
States v. Ordaz, __ F.3d __ (No. 04-1671 Feb. 22, 2005) (holding that the district court’s
determination regarding the defendant’s prior convictions did not violate the Sixth
5Amendment). 
Further, an independent review of the record by this Court uncovers no other non-
frivolous issues. Although Vaughn has filed a pro se brief, his arguments lack merit.
Vaughn’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not appropriately raised on direct
review. 
We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties and conclude
that no further discussion is necessary.
 The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
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